This paper integrates the analysis of choices on education and on technology adoption to study international economic disparities. Two candidate explanations are considered: di¤erences in distortions that a¤ect the cost of technology adoption and di¤erences in the e¤ectiveness of schools. The implications of these two factors for di¤erences in output per capita, educational attainment, and the age of technologies across-countries are assessed in a vintage capital model with technology-speci…c learning-by-doing. Predictions are obtained for a parameterized economy that matches US aggregate observations and evidence on learning. Di¤erences in investment distortions produce plausible correlations only if the major role of education is to improve the ability to learn technologies. On the other hand, di¤erences in school e¤ectiveness produce plausible results only if the role of education is to provide a productive ability that is independent of learning.
Introduction
There are persistent di¤erences in income per capita across countries. A major task of economic analysis is to identify the factor or set of factors that constitute ultimate causes of these di¤erences. Some recent studies -which include Parente and Prescott (1994) and Jovanovic and Rob (1998) -focus on the role of factors that a¤ect the adoption of technologies. In the growth literature, other papers -including Lucas (1988) The paper focuses on the role of two such factors motivated by some recent empirical studies. The …rst is di¤erences in policies that a¤ect the resource cost of capital equipment that embodies new technology. Several papers such as Jones (1994) , Chari et al. (1997) and Jovanovic and Rob (1998) …nd the price of capital to be negatively correlated with international income levels. The second factor is di¤erences in the e¤ectiveness of schools.
Measures of school inputs-e.g., teacher/pupil ratio, government expenditures, number of school hours-in Barro and Lee (1997) are positively related with the level of development. The idea of school e¤ectiveness here may also include the presence of policies and institutional distortions that a¤ect educational outcomes for given measured inputs.
The importance of these two factors as explanations of international income di¤erences is evaluated by requiring that the implied signs of the relationships between income per capita, educational attainment and the age distribution of machines be empirically consistent.
More precisely, the criterion adopted in this paper is that, for a factor to qualify as a sensible explanation of disparities, the implied di¤erences in output per capita must be positively related to di¤erences in measures of educational attainment in population 1 and negatively related to di¤erences in the average age of machines 2 . One objective of this paper is to explore whether and when the e¤ectiveness of education and/or distortions that a¤ect the cost of technology adoption pass this qualitative test.
The key feature of the model is the choice by agents on the length of schooling and the sequence of subsequent technology adoptions in the presence of exogenous embodied technological change and technology-speci…c learning-by-doing. Two di¤erent roles for education are considered. One assumption is the learning hypothesis, according to which education improves the ability of economic agents to learn new technologies. This assumption is motivated by early works on human capital by Nelson and Phelps (1966) , Welch (1970) and Schultz (1975) which emphasize that education has a value in a changing environment that requires the ability to adapt to (or to learn) new technologies. The other assumption postulates that education provides a productivity advantage which is independent of experience. It will be referred to as the neutrality hypothesis. This assumption is found in much of the growth literature like, for example, Lucas (1988) , Grosman and Helpman (1991,chapter 5), and Bils and Klenow (1998) .
Balanced-growth output comparisons are conducted for economies that di¤er in school e¤ectiveness and investment distortions. The benchmark economy roughly matches US aggregate observations and evidence on learning processes. The …ndings from the numerical exercise are as follows. Under the learning hypothesis, the model predicts positive correlations between per capita output, education and a lower machine age only when economies di¤er in adoption costs. In this case, the response of the pattern of technology adoption is key to the predicted e¤ects. Under the neutrality view, only variation in school e¤ective-ness predicts the right signs for these correlations. In this case, the decisions on technology adoption play a mere supportive role. The results are informative as to mechanisms that may be important ingredients in a theory of international disparities.
In that the interaction between education and technology is analyzed to explain economic di¤erences, this paper relates to a body of literature that includes Stokey (1991) , Ciccone (1996) , Keller (1996) , Restuccia (1997) and Jovanovic (1998) . In the present paper, the nature of this interaction is as follows. How much education individuals acquire depends on the expected pace of adoption of new technologies they will have to learn and operate after their education; on its part, the pattern of adoption of new technologies is in ‡uenced by the level of educational skills of the workers and managers that have to learn and operate those technologies. Here this interaction can be analyzed because the problem of adoption/replacement of technologies over time with technology-speci…c learning has been explicitly worked out. This di¤ers from the other papers cited that do not analyze this type of problem and cannot, therefore, analyze this connection. They assume, rather than derive, some form of technology-skill complementarity that brings automatically to-gether the skilled agents and the advanced technologies. In this sense, one contribution of the present analysis is to provide a model with stronger micro-foundations that allows to examine how the relation between education and technology may be altered by policies and the role of education.
The model also shares features with recent analyses of the choice of replacement/adoption of technologies in dynamic settings in Parente (1994) , Cooley et al. (1997) , Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1996) , Klenow (1998) , Jovanovic and Rob (1998) and Parente (1999) . In Parente (1994) and Parente (1999) , learning is not completely technology-speci…c and education is treated parametrically. Jovanovic and Rob (1998) do not consider learning-by-doing nor education but endogenize the creation of new technologies. In Klenow (1998) there is no education either but there is variable labor intensity in production which a¤ects learningby-doing; here the technology is of …xed-coe¢cients and learning depends on the passage of time. Cooley et al. (1997) introduce education, but it a¤ects the creation of technologies rather than their adoption. In Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1996) …rms hire skilled workers to accelerate learning, which resembles the learning assumption made here.
Of all these papers, only Jovanovic and Rob (1998) and Parente (1999) analyze sources of long-run disparities in international income levels. Both papers quantify the level e¤ects of investment distortions which are found to be small, although somewhat larger in Parente (1999) where adoption of below-frontier technologies is allowed. While introducing the endogenous response of education, the present paper does not improve the quantitative implications found in these other papers. Parente (1999) also explores the level e¤ects of parameters that are associated with the assumptions on education made in the present paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyzes the optimal choices on technology adoption and education. Section 4 de…nes and characterizes balanced-growth equilibria. Section 5 calibrates the model and reports steadystate comparisons associated with di¤erences in adoption costs and school e¤ectiveness under both assumptions on the role of education. Conclusions and remarks about directions for future research in section 6 conclude the paper.
The Model

Demographics
The economy is populated by a continuum of overlapping generations of agents. Each agent faces a constant probability of death per unit of time, p, which is independent of age.
The size of population is normalized to one by letting the size of each new cohort be equal to p. Then pe ¡p(t¡¿) is the measure of agents born at ¿ that are alive at time t. In the …rst part of his life, an agent goes to school for a length of time s. In the remaining part of his life, he produces output by operating a …rm.
Output technology
There is a single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption or investment.
Each …rm produces output using one machine. The ‡ow of output of a …rm depends on the quality of the machine in use, on the agent's technology-speci…c expertise, and on the agent's general skill. The quality of the machine is given by the technology embodied in it and I index technologies over the positive real line by a. Expertise in a technology, q, can take on only two values, 1 and ±, with ± > 1. General skill is represented by a positive real number h. Output of a …rm that operates a machine of quality a with technology-speci…c expertise q and general skill h is
with q 2 f1; ±g and a; h 2 R + .
At any instant of time, a …rm may either switch to a more advanced technology or continue to use the present one. I call technology adoption the decision to operate a new technology by replacing the current machine with another of di¤erent quality.
If the …rm's experience in the use of its current technology is shorter than a period of length ¹, its level of expertise in this technology is 1. Thereafter, its level of expertise in this technology increases to ±. Figure 1 depicts the typical path of technology-speci…c expertise.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
This learning-by-doing is technology-speci…c. Thus if the …rm decides to switch tech-nologies, no part of the expertise in the previous technology can be carried over to the new
The upper bound on the technologies that can be used by any …rm at time t is denoted by A(t). This frontier technology grows at a constant and exogenous rate°over time.
Switching to a technology a requires an expenditure of ¼ ¢ a units of output in the machine embodying that technology. The parameter ¼ is a policy parameter that a¤ects the resource cost of a machine.
Education
The length of time, ¹, that it takes for a …rm to accumulate expertise in a technology is determined by the schooling of the agent that runs it. The years of schooling of an agent is denoted by s. The value of ¹ depends negatively on the time an agent spends in school.
In particular, ¹ is assumed to be a non-increasing function of s, ¹(s). More speci…cally,
with ¹ 0 and¸being non-negative constants. This view of schooling is referred to as the learning hypothesis.
Schooling can also a¤ect an agent's general level of skill, h. I assume h to be a nondecreasing function, h(s), of s. Speci…cally,
with h 0 and¯being non-negative constants. This view of schooling is referred to as the neutrality hypothesis
I will interpret¸and¯as measuring the e¤ectiveness of individual time spent in the class-room. This school e¤ectiveness may certainly depend on the quality and quantity of educational inputs other than individual time. But it may also include policy distortions and institutional factors that spur or hamper the acquisition of the relevant skills. For instance, national educational programs that emphasize contents not directly usable in production will have a smaller¯; schemes that emphasize information acquisition rather than analytical skills and critical awareness will be associated with smaller¸.
Preferences, markets and the distribution of wealth
An agent belonging to cohort ¿ has preferences de…ned over life-time streams of consumption. Because of lifetime uncertainty, utility is evaluated in expected terms and is
represented by
where T is time-until-death, c(t; ¿ ) is the ‡ow of consumption to an agent of cohort ¿ at time t, ½ is the subjective time-discount rate, and ¾ is the relative rate of risk aversion.
Since the probability of death, p, is constant, T is an exponential random variable with density pe ¡pT and utility can be rewritten as
There is a perfect capital market where agents can borrow and lend. There is a market for insurance where insurance companies make premium payments to the living in exchange for receipt of their assets in the event they die. Free-entry in this market implies that the insurance premium equals p per unit of time. When an agent dies, the …rm she is operating is dissolved and there is no market for discontinued …rms.
The agent is assumed to have a wealth given by the life-time present value of percapita output minus adoption costs. The correct interpretation is to think of the agent as belonging to an extended family where all members of all ages share overall family output at every point in time
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Optimal Individual Choices
The objective of an agent is to maximize the utility function in equation (4) 
Technology Adoption
I begin by assuming that the agent has already chosen s and so the values of ¹ and h have already been determined. Before describing this problem formally I de…ne a feasible adoption plan. Exposition is simpli…ed by noting that the assumption ¼ > 0 rules out the optimality of plans characterized by continuous switching of technologies. Thus, without any loss, I ignore this possibility in the following de…nition.
De…nition 1: Given the path for the frontier technology A(t), a feasible adoption plan for an agent born at time ¿ with schooling s is de…ned by:
(i) A sequence fx j g representing the dates at which each jth adoption occurs for j = 1; 2; :::; J , such that x j¸¿ + s and x j+1 > x j . The number of adoptions, J, may be either a positive integer -in which case I adopt the convention that x J+1 = +1-or in…nity.
(ii) A path for technologies represented by a function a(t; ¿ ) de…ned for t¿ + s such that a(t; ¿) A(t), and a(t; ¿) constant for t 2 (x j ; x j+1 ) all j = 1; 2; :::; J.
The technology in (1) and the structure of learning imply that a feasible adoption plan generates the following path for the …rm's output, y(t; ¿ ),
Now the problem of a …rm consists of maximizing the present value of output net of adoption costs by choosing a feasible adoption plan or making no adoption at all. To characterize the solution it is convenient to set up the objective more formally.
The existence of an insurance premium implies that the agent discounts values at the rate r + p. De…ne by m j the length of the period over which the jth technology is operated in a feasible adoption plan, i.e. m j´xj+1 ¡ x j . The present discounted value as of date x j of net output accruing between x j and x j+1 can then be expressed as h ¢ a(
where
is an increasing, bounded, continuous and piece-wise di¤erentiable function of m j . Thus the present value as of date ¿ + s associated with a feasible adoption plan can now be expressed as the following discounted sum of net values accruing from the adoption and use of di¤erent technologies,
The problem of the …rm is to choose the adoption plan that maximizes the value of expression (7) if it is positive or else remain inactive and produce zero. I will characterize the solution when the size of investment distortions is not too large and the frontier technology does not advance too fast. This is the case when the two following conditions hold.
Assuming C1 rules out inactivity as an optimal choice and then C2 restricts the class of feasible adoption plans that are optimal. Proposition 1 states this result more precisely
Proposition 1: If conditions C1 and C2 hold then:
a. An optimal choice involves a feasible adoption plan with adoption of the frontier technology, i.e. a(x j ; ¿ ) = A(x j ) all j = 1; 2; :::; J.
b. In an optimal feasible adoption plan the …rst adoption occurs at ¿ + s, i.e.
Since the technology to be adopted when upgrading is always the frontier, solving for the optimal timing of adoptions will complete the characterization of the adoption choice.
By proposition 1 the objective in (7) can be cast in recursive form. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2: Assume C1 and C2 hold. In an optimal adoption plan x j+1 ¡ x j = m all j = 1; 2; :::; J where m 2 R + solves,
and the resulting V is such that
is the value of the expression in (7) in an optimal plan.
This proposition says that optimal upgrades occur at a constant frequency because the …rm faces the very same problem (8) when evaluated at the optimal m. Then, the maximized value of the objective (7) can be calculated as (9) .
I now proceed to characterize the solution to problem (8) . This problem is a onestage optimization program. The only di¢culty arises because the assumption of learning as a step function creates a discontinuity in the derivative of the objective at m = ¹.
Nonetheless, the optimal m can still be characterized as a solution to a …rst-order condition.
Proposition 3 establishes this result as well as the procedure to …nd the solution.
Proposition 3: Assume C1 and C2 hold. Then: a. A solution to (8) implies m < +1 and must satisfy (8) is the unique root of (10) with m > ¹. If lim ¹ ¡ ¢(m) < 0 and lim ¹ + ¢(m) < 0 then the solution to (8) is the unique root of (10) (10), one on each side of ¹.
The solution to problem (8) is the one root that yields the highest value of
According to this proposition, solving (8) (10) as,
The two-sides of this equation contain, respectively, the normalized values for the marginal bene…t and marginal cost of m. As I am looking at a situation where m > ¹, the marginal bene…t of m consists of the current ‡ow of normalized output on the current technology, ±. The marginal cost consists of the discounted foregone present value that would arise on switching to a new machine whose quality exceeds the current one's by a factor exp(°m).
It is optimal to pick m so that these two values are equalized.
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to understand how the pattern of technology adoption is a¤ected by investment distortions, ¼, and education, h and ¹. These parameters show up within W (m) in condition (11) . Furthermore, by (6), the role of h and ¼ for technology adoption is entirely captured through the ratio ¼=h. In other words, general skill dampens the presence of investment distortions. One can …gure out the e¤ect of slower learning-by-doing, lower general skill or higher investment distortions on optimal m. By reducing W (m), both larger ¹ and larger ¼=h produce a downward shift of the marginal cost leading to larger m, which implies less frequent technology adoptions.
Schooling Choice
The length of schooling attendance, s, is decided optimally taking into account its e¤ects on the value of the …rm which, in turn, depends on the response of technology adoption choices. To analyze this problem, it is useful to represent explicitly the dependence of the value of the …rm on ¹ and ¼=h. Let V (¹; ¼=h) denote the value that solves (8) as a function of these two variables. Then, by (9) in proposition 2, the value of the …rm can be written
. The agent's goal is to maximize the present discounted value of this expression as of date ¿. The technology of education described in (2) and (3) and the assumption that A(t) grows at rate°therefore imply that the agent solves Next,the specialized problems that arise under two speci…c assumptions on education are considered. The analysis will focus on each case separately to draw the implications of changes in investment distortions, ¼, and measures of the e¤ectiveness of schooling,¸and , for the optimal level of schooling s that solves (12).
The Learning Hypothesis
In this case, the parameter¯is assumed to be zero so that h is not a¤ected by s. Without loss of generality, I normalize h = 1 by setting h 0 = 1. Assume that a solution to (12) is interior, implies m > ¹ and is characterized by a …rst-order condition which must read,
which equates marginal bene…t (left) and marginal cost (right) of s
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. Now, consider the e¤ect of an increase in ¼ on this equation. The marginal cost on the right, V (¹; ¼=h), is reduced which tends to dictate higher schooling s. This is an opportunity-cost e¤ect. On the other hand, m goes up so adoptions of technology become less frequent. This reduces the marginal bene…t of education on the left-hand side of (13): less frequent adoptions make the ability to learn new technologies provided by education less valuable. This tends to reduce the optimal time spent at school. Thus investment distortions may have a negative impact on educational attainment only because of this latter e¤ect.
On its part, a lower quality of education,¸, also produces e¤ects on both sides of (13).
Again, the opportunity cost on the right-hand side is reduced which works in favor of longer schooling. On the left-hand side of (13) 
The Neutrality Hypothesis
In this case, the parameter¸is assumed to be zero so that ¹ is not a¤ected by s. As before, assume that a solution to (12) is interior, implies m > ¹ and is characterized by a …rst-order condition which must read,
which equates marginal bene…t (left) and marginal cost (right) of s. The marginal bene…t includes the increase in disembodied productivity h as well as the e¤ect on the value of the …rm through the term ¼=h 9 .
Consider a rise in ¼. Ignoring for the moment the response of the …rst term on the left-hand side, the e¤ect on V (¹; ¼=h(s)) shifts both marginal cost and marginal bene…t downwards, but the absolute shifts of marginal cost is bigger which tends to increase s
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But the …rst component of the marginal bene…t will also change. In particular, the fact that m increases, and hence adoptions become less frequent, brings about a reduction of the marginal bene…t of reducing the adoption cost term, ¼=h, through education. This tends to dictate lower education.
A reduction in the e¤ectiveness of schools also reduces the second term on the marginal bene…t side as well as the marginal cost. The …rst term of the marginal bene…t will also decrease except for the possibility that the rise in the marginal return of education due to larger ¼=h is quantitatively substantial.
Equilibrium
The exercises conducted in the previous section suggest that when the choice of technology is endogenized, the response of schooling to changes in various parameters cannot generally be determined. I now proceed with the characterization of a balanced-growth path equilibrium. I will then be able to pin down reasonable parameters values and therefore obtain predictions for di¤erences in output per capita, educational attainment and the age of capital produced by di¤erences in the level of investment distortions and the e¤ectiveness of schools.
I study balanced-growth equilibrium paths along which all aggregate quantities grow at a constant rate and the interest rate is constant. I de…ne such an equilibrium as follows. 2. Taking r as given, s is optimal in that it solves (12).
3. Given r, c(t; ¿ ) maximizes utility of the agent of cohort ¿ in (4) subject to the constraint that the present value of consumption cannot exceed his wealth Z(¿ ),
4. Market clearing and aggregate consistency. Aggregate consumption equals aggregate output minus investment 11 , 5. c(t) and y(t) grow at a constant rate.
6. Conditions C1 and C2 hold.
Points 1 and 2 in the de…nition require that agents behave optimally. By point 6 and the results in section 3, the individual path of output then results from writing (5) for a feasible plan with x j+1 ¡ x j = m all j and a(x j ; ¿ ) = A(x j ). This yields,
where m and s solve (8) and (12) respectively. The formula for aggregate output in point 4, which takes into account the age structure of population, can then be developed to obtain 1 ¡ e
Hence, aggregate output grows at the same rate as the frontier technology°and, by the market-clearing condition (15) in point 4, so does aggregate consumption and, hence, point 5 in the de…nition holds. It remains to …nd for which interest rate r, if any, percapita consumption, c(t), calculated by aggregation of individual consumption, c(t; ¿), is consistent with the market clearing condition in (15) . With the preferences described by (4) and the assumption of free borrowing and lending, point 3 implies that individual consumption, c(t; ¿), grows at a constant rate°c with°c
To add up consumption of the di¤erent agents, it is necessary to be speci…c about the distribution of wealth across cohorts Z(¿). The assumption of the model is that Z(¿ ) is the present value of net output per capita over the agent's lifetime,
Using the intertemporal budget constraint in point 3 and constant growth rates°c and°for individual consumption and aggregate net output respectively, the condition for aggregate consumption in point 4 can be rewritten as
In a balanced growth equilibrium, the market clearing condition (15) must be satis…ed for consumption as given in (19) and growth of individual consumption as in (17) . Simple inspection indicates this holds for r =°and for°c =°. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Assume Z(¿ ) is given by (18) and conditions C1 and C2 hold for r =°and r = ¾°+ ½. Then the economy has two balanced growth equilibria.
The type-1 equilibrium has r = ¾°+ ½ and°c =°. The type-2 equilibrium has r =°and°c = (r ¡ ½)=¾.
To develop the intuition, notice that on a balanced growth equilibrium individual consumption must grow at a constant rate. There are di¤erent such paths that satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint and market clearing. In the type-1 equilibrium, individual consumption is growing at the same rate as per-capita net output at every time. In this case, all agents of all ages have the same consumption level equal to per-capita net output.
Another path consistent with market clearing is associated with the type-2 equilibrium. If, as I will assume later, ¾¸1, then consumption declines relative to net individual income over the life-cycle so that young agents borrow and old agents lend. A complete analysis of the stability properties of the two equilibria is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Numerical Experiments
Calibration
In order to be able to match observations on the interest rate and output growth, the type-1 equilibrium is chosen to select the benchmark parameters. The parameters of the model are:°, p, ½, ¾, ±, ¼, h 0 ,¯, ¹ 0 and¸. I will calibrate these parameters under two di¤erent assumptions about the role of education. These two assumptions are the learning and the neutrality hypotheses discussed in section 3. For each of the two calibrations, I use the following procedure.
1. Set calibration targets for long-run growth rate of output per-capita, risk-free interest rate, life-expectancy, speed of learning-by-doing, progress ratio, investment/output ratio, years of schooling and general skill.
2. Choose°, ¾ and ½ so that, using proposition 4, the targets for the growth rate of output per capita and the risk-free interest rate in step 1 are matched. Choose p so that 1=p matches the target for life-expectancy in 1. Choose ± consistent with the progress ratio in 1.
3. Fix values of s and h consistent with the targets in step 1.
4. Pick a value for ¼.
Pick a value for ¹.
6. Compute the optimal adoption length m. Finally, in step 9 the computation of the optimal choice of s is done on a discrete grid.
In all the calculations, the objective in problem (12) is well de…ned with the possibility (under the learning hypothesis) of a local maximum at s = 0. means that the analysis in section 3 carries over to interpret the results. creates a positive correlation between output per capita and educational attainment, and a negative correlation with the age of the machines in operation.
Type-1 equilibrium
Under the neutrality hypothesis, the prediction for the correlation output-years of schooling is the opposite. Section 3.2.2 showed that, much like under the learning assumption, the higher cost of equipment reduces the frequency of technology upgrades.
Thus education, to the extent that it contributes to reduce the perceived cost of adoptions (through the term ¼=h), becomes less valuable which tends to shorten the optimal schooling period. But in this economy, this e¤ect is too weak as compared with the response to the reduction in the opportunity cost of schooling time.
The e¤ect of changes in measures of the e¤ectiveness of schools is illustrated in table 3.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Under the learning hypothesis for education, di¤erences in¸predict a negative association between educational attainment and output. In this economy, a lower¸leads to a reduction in the opportunity cost of schooling time that overwhelms the other e¤ects discussed in section 3.2.1. In particular, it is true that the induced rise in m tends to reduce the value of education, but in this case this e¤ect is too weak.
Under the neutrality view of education, as discussed in section 3.2.2, a reduction inr educes the direct marginal return of education as well as the indirect return from reducing the e¤ective cost of technology adoption ¼=h. These creates incentives for shorter schooling that dominate the response to a lower opportunity costs of schooling time. Thus lower e¤ectiveness of schools reduces schooling and output per capita. In addition, it increases the e¤ective adoption cost, ¼=h(s), thereby raising the average age of capital and reducing output per capita further.
Type-2 equilibrium
With these parameters, type-2 equilibria are associated with a lower interest rate than type-1 equilibria. Hence the model produces higher levels of investment in education and 
INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE
Robustness and Extensions
With parameters calibrated to the type-2 steady-state, the qualitative …ndings remain the same. Also, the nature of the results seems robust to alternative parameterizations and interpretations of parameters within the model. Concerning the latter, the interpretation of ¹ 0 and h 0 as measures of the e¤ectiveness of schools leads to the same results. However, the model itself contains simplifying assumptions that at this stage deserve to be examined more carefully. The …rst is the assumption on the distribution of wealth as expressed in equation (18) . The second is the assumption of learning as a discrete process. In the remaining of this section, I will examine alternative assumptions and demonstrate that the results derived so far remain largely intact.
The distribution of wealth
An alternative to (18) is the more natural assumption that an agent's lifetime wealth, Z(¿ ),
consists of the value of the …rm he or she operates. This amounts to replace (18) by the following,
where the notation is the same as in problem (12) . The equilibrium conditions apply to this case. Furthermore, a modest amount of work shows that, under the assumption on the distribution of wealth contained in (20) , the characterization of balanced-growth equilibria is similar to that provided in proposition 4. As in that proposition, r =°is an equilibrium.
Thus the type-2 equilibrium characterizes a balanced-growth path irrespective of the wealth distribution. Moreover, for all the economies analyzed under the assumption in (20) , I
have found that there is another equilibrium that, in terms of the value of r relative to the one in the type-2 equilibrium, resembles the type-1 equilibrium of proposition 4. However, di¤erently from the type-1 equilibrium under assumption (18) , when (20) INSERT TABLES 6 and 7 ABOUT HERE
Continuous learning
Assume learning-by-doing is a smooth function of time. In particular, let technology-speci…c skill, q(m), be governed by the following version of the learning curve in Parente (1994) ,
where ± still represents the progress-ratio and ¹ measures the speed of learning. I maintain the other assumptions of the model. In this case, propositions 1 and 2 still hold and the solution to the adoption problem is the unique solution to a smooth …rst order condition.
Di¤erently from the case with discreet learning, now the qualitative e¤ect of ¹ on the optimal frequency of adoptions is ambiguous. The same arguments as before lead to the two balanced-growth path equilibria in proposition 4. I choose the analogous to equation The quantitative properties of the model are surely related to its implications for the returns to schooling. For the benchmark economy, the return to one more year of education under the neutrality assumption is around 4 per cent for the type-1 equilibrium
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. Under the learning assumption, the …gure lies between 3.4-6.7 per cent. Bils and Klenow (1998) document an average Mincerian return to schooling of 9.9 per cent on a sample of 52 countries. Hence the calibration of the present model seems to grossly underestimate the return to education. This is more so for the type-2 equilibrium where the interest rate is particularly low.
6 Conclusion and Final Remarks. Directions for further research involve natural extensions of the present framework.
The model contains assumptions that impose tight bounds on the size of the di¤erences in income that can be produced. Notably, all agents adopt the frontier technology and learning is completely technology-speci…c. I think that a model analyzing the transmission of knowledge across technologies, rather than uniquely its accumulation within each single technology, o¤ers reasonable expectations of better matching the data. In such a framework, the mechanisms analyzed here would still play an important role.
7 Appendix: Proof of Propositions 1 Through 3.
Proof of proposition 1: C1 implies that the solution is a feasible adoption plan (J; fx j g; a(t; ¿ )) since a feasible adoption plan with J = 1 exists where the expression in (7) has a positive value.
I will now prove that in an optimal plan W (m j ) > 0 for all j = 1; 2; :::; J.
In an optimal adoption plan W (m j 0 ) > 0 for some j
0
. Then W (m 1 ) > 0 since, otherwise, the value in (7) would increase by holding on until x 1 = x j 0 .
Finally, assume that, for some j in an optimal plan, W (m j ) 0. Since W (:)
is monotonically increasing, the value in (7) would increase by holding out the j ¡ 1th adoption until x j+1 . But then x j cannot be the jth adoption which contradicts the optimality of the plan containing x j . Now part (a) follows from inspection of (7). To prove part (b), use that A(x j ) = A(¿ + s) exp(°(x j ¡ (¿ + s))) to rewrite (7) as
where the equality follows from the notation m j´xj+1 ¡ x j . Therefore, for any given sequence of tenures fm j g, by anticipating the start of production [i.e. reducing x 1 ] the value of (7) increases unambiguously by assumption C2. That ¿ + s is the earliest feasible starting date concludes.Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2:
The results in Proposition 1 imply that (7) can be written as
So the problem is to choose J and fm j g that maximize V (fm j g J j=1 ). The objective can be written recursively as
for k = 1; 2; :::; J. Let V k´m ax V (fm j g J j=k ). Since the value V (fm j g J j=k ) only depends on the sequence of tenures, the solution must be the same value V = V k for all k. Hence the problem is equivalent to solving (8) . Expression (9) It is helpful to write ¢(m) as
where It is useful to state this as a lemma. As in the previous case there exists one m < ¹ such that ¡(m) = 0.
Similarly, using that C1 and C2 imply ¡(+1) < 0, there is also a local maximum m > ¹. By (8) , at the solution
This concludes the proof.
Q.E.D. This is a simpli…cation with respect to Parente (1994) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) who allow for di¤erent degrees of transferability of knowledge across vintages. In terms of Jovanovic and Nyarko, I am in case ® = 0 (in their equation (3)). 
5
This is a simplifying assumption that facilitates exposition. Another possible assumption is that an agent's wealth is given by the present value of the …rm he or she operates.
Section 5 shows that this more natural assumption has no substantive e¤ect.
6
With C1 but not C2, it is optimal to wait in…nity to start producing. Without C1, it is optimal to produce zero. Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are proved in appendix A 7 The discussion that follows relies on the following derivation. Use the envelope theorem [i.e. Eq. (11)] to show that the …rst left-hand side term in (13) can be written as,
If lower school e¤ectiveness is represented by larger ¹ 0 rather than smaller¸, then ¡¹ 0 goes up which works for larger s.
9
For the discussion that follows it is useful to calculate
Then the derivative of this expression with respect to ¼ is
If V did not depend on h, then the two e¤ects would exactly cancel out.
11
The demographic assumptions made imply that p exp(¡pu) is the size of population 
12
The average age of machines is computed as (1=°) log(A(t)=A(t)) with A(t) = A(t)(p=(°+ p))(1 ¡ exp(°+ p)m)=(1 ¡ exp(¡pm)).
13
Rapping (1965) found a 40 percent yearly productivity growth in US ship-building yards over 1941-1944. These …gures suggest a lower bound for the progress ratio around 3.3.
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) …t learning curves to productivity data on a number of new activities. The data they use include progress ratios ranging from 111 to 3, but for many activities more modest learning rates are found. Other studies seem to suggest that progress ratios are generally of the order or several percentage points only, much smaller than the several-fold gains found in case studies. In Bahk and Gort (1993) the total productivity gain is around 15 percent for recently-born plants (average 1 per cent per year over 14 years). On a sample of new plant start-ups in US manufacturing industries, Bessen (1997) estimates an average progress ratio after learning is exhausted (5 years) of 5.7 per cent.
As Bessen (1997) points out, the case study literature shows that most of productivity gains from learning occur initially over a short span of time. Thus low frequency data and the loss of information on initial months of activity may explain why some studies-such as Bahk and Gort (1993)-tend to underestimate the measures of learning or, in other words, to overestimate initial productivity.
14
As mentioned in footnote 13, it seems that most learning accrues during the …rst few months of an activity. Bessen (1997) argues that assuming that, on average, reported annual data drops the …rst 6 months of activity helps to reconcile the di¤ering …ndings across empirical studies on learning. The continuous-learning approximation to the current calibration implies a half-life of 0.47, which means that after the …rst 6 months of activity about a 30 per cent increase in productivity is left to be learnt. This is more in line with the industry …gures found in Bahk and Gort (1993) and Bessen (1997) .
Parente (1999) assumes a larger progress ratio and a somehow higher speed of learning.
15
In other words ,
where m is the model's optimal time between adoptions and W (m) is as in equation (6) with ± = 2. 16 This number has been calculated numerically from the impact on aggregate output per …rm of changing s exogenously from 9 to 10 and from 10 to 11. It is close to the percentage change in h,¯=s, thus suggesting that the e¤ect of education on output through ¼=h is small in the margin. 
